History Podcasts

Teijiro Toyoda

Teijiro Toyoda


We are searching data for your request:

Forums and discussions:
Manuals and reference books:
Data from registers:
Wait the end of the search in all databases.
Upon completion, a link will appear to access the found materials.

Teijiro Toyoda was born in Japan in 1885. He joined the Japanese Navy and by 1941 had reached the rank of admiral.

In April 1941 Fumimaro Kondoye appointed him minister of commerce and industry. A post he held for three months before becoming foreign minister in July 1941.

He was removed by Hideki Tojo and became president of the Nittetsu-Nihon Iron Manufacturing Company and chairman of Tekko Toseikai Iron and Steel Company.

Toyoda returned to power as foreign minister under Kantaro Suzuki (5th April 1945 - 17th August 1945).


By signing up, I agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to occasionally receive special offers from Foreign Policy.

As a blunt tool of diplomacy, the concept of sanctions has been around at least from the time of the ancient Greeks, when Athens imposed a trade embargo on its neighbor Megara in 432 B.C. Since then, there has been a long history of countries blockading their enemies to compel a change in behavior. But how did this tactic morph into today’s “targeted” or “smart” sanctions — measures such as arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans on key individuals and organizations — now aimed at Iran and Syria? They may be more humane and high-tech than a flotilla at sea, but are sanctions any more effective today than they were 2,400 years ago? After all, Athens’s embargo didn’t cow Megara into submission — it helped trigger the Peloponnesian War.

1892-1894
In a series of conferences, European pacifists debate how the decisions of a proposed international system of arbitration would be enforced. Belgian international law professor Henri La Fontaine persuades delegates to endorse peaceful “sanctions,” borrowing a legal term that originated in the 17th century but had yet to permeate statecraft.

1918
After World War I, French statesmen Léon Bourgeois and Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant call for a “society of nations” that could isolate a “recalcitrant nation” by applying sanctions — a “diplomatic expression,” they explain, “meaning the various steps for enforcing compliance.”

1919
Promoting the League of Nations, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson advocates “absolute” boycotts, in which all citizens of an aggressor country would be unable to trade, communicate, or do business with League members.

1935-1936
Wilson’s theory flunks its first major test as League of Nations sanctions against Italy — defanged by British and French noncompliance — unsurprisingly fail to persuade Benito Mussolini to withdraw his troops from Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia).

1940-1941
U.S. trade sanctions against Japan contribute to Tokyo’s decision to enter World War II. Japanese Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda denounces “this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement” months before the Pearl Harbor attack.

1945
The United Nations enshrines sanctions in its charter and centralizes the act of decision-making in the Security Council. But it will impose mandatory sanctions only twice — against white-minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa — during the Cold War, when superpowers jockey for influence by adopting unilateral sanctions such as the U.S. embargo of Cuba.

1967
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung assails the prevailing wisdom that sanctions should inflict maximum harm on a country’s economy, arguing that people adapt to the measures and may rally around their leaders. “The collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty,” he observes.

1980s
International sanctions against apartheid are strengthened by a grassroots divestment campaign from civil society groups that withdraws some $20 billion from companies doing business in South Africa, placing unprecedented private pressure on the country’s government.

1990
The Security Council, united by alarm over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, imposes “comprehensive sanctions” on Baghdad. The most powerful sanctions in history — intended to cripple Saddam Hussein’s regime and prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction — inspire sweeping measures against the former Yugoslavia and Haiti later in the decade.

1993-1994
Following Washington’s lead, the Security Council slaps financial sanctions on members of Haiti’s military junta — the first time it targets specific leaders rather than government assets. But U.N. action is erratic and sluggish, and U.S. officials make several blunders, at one point sanctioning a Haitian pastor when they intended to target a military lieutenant with the same name.

1995
As evidence of the collateral damage inflicted by sanctions on Iraq mounts (a U.N. study — later discredited — estimates that more than half a million Iraqi children have died because of the embargo), the terms “smart” and “targeted” sanctions gain traction. In one of the first public references to the new lingo, British Ambassador David Hannay warns the United Nations not to “be seduced” by “smart sanctions” because “they are notoriously hard to enforce.” The Security Council, meanwhile, pokes its first hole in the sanctions regime against Iraq by establishing the Oil-for-Food Program, allowing Baghdad to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods.

1997-1999
The United Nations forges a template for targeted sanctions by aiming travel bans, asset freezes, and blood-diamond embargoes at the Angolan rebel group UNITA and empowering a committee and expert panel to monitor violations. “We will propose sanctions [in Angola] with no humanitarian consequences,” boasts Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s U.N. ambassador.

2001
Weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations imposes unprecedented counterterrorism obligations on its 189 member states, mandating that they freeze the assets and restrict the movement of designated terrorists and their supporters — no easy task given that terrorist networks conduct many transactions in cash or through informal hawala money-transfer systems. U.S. President George W. Bush threatens to bar any foreign bank that refuses to freeze terrorists’ assets from doing business in the United States. Smart sanctions, says Bush aide Juan Zarate, go “on steroids.”

2003
Two months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Security Council formally ends comprehensive sanctions against Baghdad. While the measures never curtailed Saddam’s WMD program enough to satisfy the Bush administration, they had, as political scientist Daniel Drezner wrote, “hung like a millstone around the practice of economic statecraft” for more than a decade.

2003-2004
The United Nations and United States lift targeted sanctions imposed on Libya in the 1980s and 1990s after leader Muammar al-Qaddafi renounces terrorism and dismantles his WMD program. Postmortems characterize sanctions as just one of several factors that swayed Qaddafi.

2004
The United Nations raises human rights concerns about individuals who face targeted sanctions for alleged ties to terrorism but have little recourse to challenge the opaque decisions that land them on U.N. blacklists. (It’s not even easy, a panel chair says, to “get dead people off the list.”)

2006
In response to a North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council rolls out a largely toothless embargo on Kim Jong Il’s favorite luxury goods, including Hennessy cognac and Rolex watches, in the first trade sanctions personally targeting a head of state.

2006-2009
U.S. Treasury Department official Stuart Levey meets with dozens of foreign banks to persuade them to comply with U.S. sanctions against Iran.

2011
Targeted sanctions against Qaddafi and his associates during the Libyan uprising highlight the difficulty of freezing assets in the 21st century despite more sophisticated tactics and technology. Bank software struggles to recognize the numerous spellings of Qaddafi’s name, while state funds are intertwined with dirty cash and ownership is obscured by vague and elaborate offshore vehicles and trusts that prove difficult to unwind. The new Libyan government begins the thorny legal process of reclaiming Qaddafi’s estimated $200 billion in assets around the world after the leader’s death.

2011-2012
The United States and Europe impose their toughest sanctions yet on Iran — including an oil embargo and sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank — over its nuclear program, though countries like China resist such efforts. Nearly a year of targeted sanctions against Syria, meanwhile, fails to end a bloody crackdown on regime opponents. “They cannot isolate Syria,” President Bashar al-Assad declares. “We are not [an] oil-producing country. We are not like Iraq.”

As a blunt tool of diplomacy, the concept of sanctions has been around at least from the time of the ancient Greeks, when Athens imposed a trade embargo on its neighbor Megara in 432 B.C. Since then, there has been a long history of countries blockading their enemies to compel a change in behavior. But how did this tactic morph into today’s “targeted” or “smart” sanctions — measures such as arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans on key individuals and organizations — now aimed at Iran and Syria? They may be more humane and high-tech than a flotilla at sea, but are sanctions any more effective today than they were 2,400 years ago? After all, Athens’s embargo didn’t cow Megara into submission — it helped trigger the Peloponnesian War.

1892-1894
In a series of conferences, European pacifists debate how the decisions of a proposed international system of arbitration would be enforced. Belgian international law professor Henri La Fontaine persuades delegates to endorse peaceful “sanctions,” borrowing a legal term that originated in the 17th century but had yet to permeate statecraft.

1918
After World War I, French statesmen Léon Bourgeois and Paul Henri d’Estournelles de Constant call for a “society of nations” that could isolate a “recalcitrant nation” by applying sanctions — a “diplomatic expression,” they explain, “meaning the various steps for enforcing compliance.”

1919
Promoting the League of Nations, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson advocates “absolute” boycotts, in which all citizens of an aggressor country would be unable to trade, communicate, or do business with League members.

1935-1936
Wilson’s theory flunks its first major test as League of Nations sanctions against Italy — defanged by British and French noncompliance — unsurprisingly fail to persuade Benito Mussolini to withdraw his troops from Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia).

1940-1941
U.S. trade sanctions against Japan contribute to Tokyo’s decision to enter World War II. Japanese Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda denounces “this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement” months before the Pearl Harbor attack.

1945
The United Nations enshrines sanctions in its charter and centralizes the act of decision-making in the Security Council. But it will impose mandatory sanctions only twice — against white-minority governments in Rhodesia and South Africa — during the Cold War, when superpowers jockey for influence by adopting unilateral sanctions such as the U.S. embargo of Cuba.

1967
Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung assails the prevailing wisdom that sanctions should inflict maximum harm on a country’s economy, arguing that people adapt to the measures and may rally around their leaders. “The collective nature of economic sanctions makes them hit the innocent along with the guilty,” he observes.

1980s
International sanctions against apartheid are strengthened by a grassroots divestment campaign from civil society groups that withdraws some $20 billion from companies doing business in South Africa, placing unprecedented private pressure on the country’s government.

1990
The Security Council, united by alarm over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, imposes “comprehensive sanctions” on Baghdad. The most powerful sanctions in history — intended to cripple Saddam Hussein’s regime and prevent the development of weapons of mass destruction — inspire sweeping measures against the former Yugoslavia and Haiti later in the decade.

1993-1994
Following Washington’s lead, the Security Council slaps financial sanctions on members of Haiti’s military junta — the first time it targets specific leaders rather than government assets. But U.N. action is erratic and sluggish, and U.S. officials make several blunders, at one point sanctioning a Haitian pastor when they intended to target a military lieutenant with the same name.

1995
As evidence of the collateral damage inflicted by sanctions on Iraq mounts (a U.N. study — later discredited — estimates that more than half a million Iraqi children have died because of the embargo), the terms “smart” and “targeted” sanctions gain traction. In one of the first public references to the new lingo, British Ambassador David Hannay warns the United Nations not to “be seduced” by “smart sanctions” because “they are notoriously hard to enforce.” The Security Council, meanwhile, pokes its first hole in the sanctions regime against Iraq by establishing the Oil-for-Food Program, allowing Baghdad to sell oil in exchange for humanitarian goods.

1997-1999
The United Nations forges a template for targeted sanctions by aiming travel bans, asset freezes, and blood-diamond embargoes at the Angolan rebel group UNITA and empowering a committee and expert panel to monitor violations. “We will propose sanctions [in Angola] with no humanitarian consequences,” boasts Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s U.N. ambassador.

2001
Weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations imposes unprecedented counterterrorism obligations on its 189 member states, mandating that they freeze the assets and restrict the movement of designated terrorists and their supporters — no easy task given that terrorist networks conduct many transactions in cash or through informal hawala money-transfer systems. U.S. President George W. Bush threatens to bar any foreign bank that refuses to freeze terrorists’ assets from doing business in the United States. Smart sanctions, says Bush aide Juan Zarate, go “on steroids.”

2003
Two months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Security Council formally ends comprehensive sanctions against Baghdad. While the measures never curtailed Saddam’s WMD program enough to satisfy the Bush administration, they had, as political scientist Daniel Drezner wrote, “hung like a millstone around the practice of economic statecraft” for more than a decade.

2003-2004
The United Nations and United States lift targeted sanctions imposed on Libya in the 1980s and 1990s after leader Muammar al-Qaddafi renounces terrorism and dismantles his WMD program. Postmortems characterize sanctions as just one of several factors that swayed Qaddafi.

2004
The United Nations raises human rights concerns about individuals who face targeted sanctions for alleged ties to terrorism but have little recourse to challenge the opaque decisions that land them on U.N. blacklists. (It’s not even easy, a panel chair says, to “get dead people off the list.”)

2006
In response to a North Korean nuclear test, the Security Council rolls out a largely toothless embargo on Kim Jong Il’s favorite luxury goods, including Hennessy cognac and Rolex watches, in the first trade sanctions personally targeting a head of state.

2006-2009
U.S. Treasury Department official Stuart Levey meets with dozens of foreign banks to persuade them to comply with U.S. sanctions against Iran.

2011
Targeted sanctions against Qaddafi and his associates during the Libyan uprising highlight the difficulty of freezing assets in the 21st century despite more sophisticated tactics and technology. Bank software struggles to recognize the numerous spellings of Qaddafi’s name, while state funds are intertwined with dirty cash and ownership is obscured by vague and elaborate offshore vehicles and trusts that prove difficult to unwind. The new Libyan government begins the thorny legal process of reclaiming Qaddafi’s estimated $200 billion in assets around the world after the leader’s death.

2011-2012
The United States and Europe impose their toughest sanctions yet on Iran — including an oil embargo and sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank — over its nuclear program, though countries like China resist such efforts. Nearly a year of targeted sanctions against Syria, meanwhile, fails to end a bloody crackdown on regime opponents. “They cannot isolate Syria,” President Bashar al-Assad declares. “We are not [an] oil-producing country. We are not like Iraq.”

Uri Friedman is deputy managing editor at Foreign Policy . Before joining FP , he reported for the Christian Science Monitor, worked on corporate strategy for Atlantic Media, helped launch the Atlantic Wire, and covered international affairs for the site. A proud native of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, he studied European history at the University of Pennsylvania and has lived in Barcelona, Spain and Geneva, Switzerland. Twitter: @UriLF


Jikaku is the practice of counting strokes in Kanji and Katakana. The number of strokes determine good and bad luck. “Toyota” has 8 strokes versus 10, and 8 is a number in Japan that is associated with good luck and fortune. So, the official record tells us that pretty much sealed the deal: change it from “D” to a “T”.

But, there are objections to this reason. Some people believe that the number 8 in Japan isn’t a big deal while in China it is important. It’s hard to verify either of these claims, but is one prevailing objection out there.

There are other accounts of the name change that point to other reasons such appealing to an international audiences and international acceptance.

But, I have another theory.


This Day In History: Toyota Founder Dies

On March 27, 1952, Kiichiro Toyoda died. He was the man responsible for transforming his father’s textile machinery business into what grew to become the world’s largest automaker: Toyota.

(Welcome to Today in History, the series where we dive into important historical events that have had a significant impact on the automotive or racing world. If you have something you’d like to see that falls on an upcoming weekend, let me know at eblackstock [at] jalopnik [dot] com.)

You read that right. Toyota wasn’t initially created as a car company. Sakichi Toyoda, called “Japan’s Thomas Edison,” invented the automatic loom, and he hired his son at the company when Kiichiro was old enough to work there.

But Kiichiro Toyoda had other plans. By the late 1920s, he was dreaming up different cars, and in 1933, he established an automobile division of his father’s company. Two years later, he had released two cars.

So, where did the name “Toyota” come from? According to History , it was easier to spell in Japanese characters and was considered luckier because it could be written with eight strokes of the pen.

Whatever luck was imbued in the name paid off, because Toyota grew to accomplish great things despite a rocky start. Ford and GM had built factories in Japan in the 1920s, so Toyoda drew his inspiration for some of his first cars from his American competitors by literally buying local Ford or GM products and reverse engineering them. As a result, the company’s first real car, the AA, looked like a knockoff Chevy sedan. But people were into it—they liked the fact that they could buy a Japanese-built car, and Toyoda is said to have paved the way for Japanese automakers in a critical time before American motor companies could completely dominate production.

That said, things quickly went south. The company was forced to take a break during World War II and didn’t resume production again until 1947, at which point materials were hard to source and people just didn’t have the money to buy them.

Despite his death coming two years later, Toyoda resigned from the company in 1950. The company was going out of business, and the auto union went on a strike that lasted two months due to layoffs and wage reductions. He was succeeded by Tazio Ishida, who had been the chief executive of the Toyoda Automatic Loom company. In 1957, Toyoda’s cousin Eiji Toyoda took over.

Because of his early death at age 57, Kiichiro Toyoda never saw his company make its rebound. The Korean War saw the American military putting in orders for Japanese-made vehicles, which kick-started the auto industry. In 1957, the Crown became the first Japanese vehicle imported to the United States. In the 1960s, Toyota began to expand its manufacturing efforts into other countries. By the 1980s, Toyota was building cars in the US and pursuing a global motorsport effort. In 2008, it became the world’s largest automaker.

It all happened after Toyoda’s death, but his legacy still lives on in the name and roots he endowed to the company. It turned out to be quite lucky indeed.

Weekends at Jalopnik. Managing editor at A Girl's Guide to Cars. Lead IndyCar writer and assistant editor at Frontstretch. Novelist. Motorsport fanatic.


Toyota Motor Corporation Founder Kiichiro Toyoda Inducted into Automotive Hall of Fame

Detroit, July 20, 2018―Cited for his extraordinary vision and entrepreneurial spirit, Toyota Motor Corporation founder and former president Kiichiro Toyoda was inducted into the Automotive Hall of Fame last evening in Detroit.

Kiichiro Toyoda was one of five industry leaders named to this year's Automotive Hall of Fame induction class. He is credited with expanding Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, a successful textile business created by his father, Sakichi Toyoda, into the world of automotive manufacturing in 1933. Kiichiro Toyoda served as president of Toyota Motor Corporation from 1941 to 1950. His technical skills and leadership forged the foundations of a company that would eventually grow to be one of the most respected corporations in the world. (See here for more information about Kiichiro Toyoda.)

"Kiichiro Toyoda embodied the foresight and innovation that few people in history possess, demonstrated by his significant contributions to the automotive industry. We are honored to include him in the 2018 induction class to the Automotive Hall of Fame", stated Ramzi Hermiz, President and CEO, Shiloh Industries and Board Chairman, Automotive Hall of Fame.

A contingent of Toyota Motor Corporation executives, led by Chairman of the Board Takeshi Uchiyamada, were on hand at the Automotive Hall of Fame Induction and Awards Gala Ceremony on July 19. Mr. Uchiyamada accepted Kiichiro Toyoda's award on behalf of the company and the family.

"America was a special place for Kiichiro. He was amazed by the prevalence of automobiles driving around U.S. cities in the late 1920s, and that was the catalyst for his determination to establish an automotive industry in his home country. As a successor and his grandson, I am very grateful and proud that Kiichiro has been inducted into the Automotive Hall of Fame in America," said Akio Toyoda, president of Toyota Motor Corporation. "Kiichiro boldly changed Toyota's business model from automatic looms to automobiles without being constrained by previous successes. As his induction comes at a time when our industry is facing profound changes, I believe his message today would be to work hard to help the industry revolutionize the future of mobility, even if success is not immediate. I deeply appreciate the Automotive Hall of Fame for inducting my grandfather and our founder," he added.

The celebration was highlighted by the presence of a 1936 Toyoda AA replica vehicle, on loan from the Petersen Automotive Museum in Los Angeles. The Toyoda AA was designed and manufactured under the guidance of Kiichiro Toyoda. The AA was the company's first production automobile and served as Kiichiro Toyoda's initial opportunity to experiment with waste-free and efficiency-focused production techniques, including the famous "just-in-time" concept. The vehicle helped pave the way for the renowned "Toyota Production System."

About the Automotive Hall of Fame

The Automotive Hall of Fame tells the stories of those who have made outstanding contributions to the automotive industry and has honored nearly 800 men and women from around the world. The Automotive Hall of Fame is located at 21400 Oakwood Blvd. in Dearborn, Michigan and is open to the public for tours. You can visit the Automotive Hall of Fame online at www.automotivehalloffame.org or on its Facebook and Instagram pages.


Teijiro Toyoda - History

Today, 70 years after Pearl Harbor, a remarkable secret history, written from 1943 to 1963, has come to light. It is Hoover’s explanation of what happened before, during and after the world war that may prove yet the death knell of the West.

Edited by historian George Nash, Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath is a searing indictment of FDR and the men around him as politicians who lied prodigiously about their desire to keep America out of war, even as they took one deliberate step after another to take us into war.

Yet the book is no polemic. The 50-page run-up to the war in the Pacific uses memoirs and documents from all sides to prove Hoover’s indictment. And perhaps the best way to show the power of this book is the way Hoover does it — chronologically, painstakingly, week by week.

Consider Japan’s situation in the summer of 1941. Bogged down in a four year war in China she could neither win nor end, having moved into French Indochina, Japan saw herself as near the end of her tether.

Inside the government was a powerful faction led by Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye that desperately did not want a war with the United States.

The “pro-Anglo-Saxon” camp included the navy, whose officers had fought alongside the U.S. and Royal navies in World War I, while the war party was centered on the army, Gen. Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, a bitter anti-American.

On July 18, 1941, Konoye ousted Matsuoka, replacing him with the “pro-Anglo-Saxon” Adm. Teijiro Toyoda.

The U.S. response: On July 25, we froze all Japanese assets in the United States, ending all exports and imports, and denying Japan the oil upon which the nation and empire depended.

Stunned, Konoye still pursued his peace policy by winning secret support from the navy and army to meet FDR on the U.S.

side of the Pacific to hear and respond to U.S. demands.

U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew implored Washington not to ignore Konoye’s offer, that the prince had convinced him an agreement could be reached on Japanese withdrawal from Indochina and South and Central China. Out of fear of Mao’s armies and Stalin’s Russia, Tokyo wanted to hold a buffer in North China.

On Aug. 28, Japan’s ambassador in Washington presented FDR a personal letter from Konoye imploring him to meet.

Tokyo begged us to keep Konoye’s offer secret, as the revelation of a Japanese prime minister’s offering to cross the Pacific to talk to an American president could imperil his government.

On Sept. 3, the Konoye letter was leaked to the Herald-Tribune.

On Sept. 6, Konoye met again at a three-hour dinner with Grew to tell him Japan now agreed with the four principles the Americans were demanding as the basis for peace. No response.

On Sept. 29, Grew sent what Hoover describes as a “prayer” to the president not to let this chance for peace pass by.

On Sept. 30, Grew wrote Washington, “Konoye’s warship is ready waiting to take him to Honolulu, Alaska or anyplace designated by the president.”

No response. On Oct. 16, Konoye’s cabinet fell.

In November, the U.S. intercepted two new offers from Tokyo: a Plan A for an end to the China war and occupation of Indochina and, if that were rejected, a Plan B, a modus vivendi where neither side would make any new move. When presented, these, too, were rejected out of hand.

At a Nov. 25 meeting of FDR’s war council, Secretary of War Henry Stimson’s notes speak of the prevailing consensus: “The question was how we should maneuver them (the Japanese) into … firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”

“We can wipe the Japanese off the map in three months,” wrote Navy Secretary Frank Knox.

As Grew had predicted, Japan, a “hara-kiri nation,” proved more likely to fling herself into national suicide for honor than to allow herself to be humiliated

Out of the war that arose from the refusal to meet Prince Konoye came scores of thousands of U.S. dead, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the fall of China to Mao Zedong, U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the rise of a new arrogant China that shows little respect for the great superpower of yesterday.

If you would know the history that made our world, spend a week with Mr. Hoover’s book.


Toyota | The Name You Know, The History You Don’t

Toyota is a brand that holds 40% hold in the global automobile industry. In India itself, the company has been strongly selling safer cars from more than 20 years now. But it was not always a carmaker. Yes, that’s true. The company started with something else. Let’s dig deeper into the history and find out.

1918: The Brand Is Born

Sakichi Toyoda with his son, Kiichiro Toyoda created Toyoda Spinning and Weaving Company, the company responsible for inventing Japan’s first power loom. By 1924, Sakichi was able to build an automatic loom which was his lifelong dream. Toyoda Automatic Loom Works was established in 1926. But Kiichiro was not ready to settle and he made a visit to Europe and the USA in the late 1920s. This is when the interest for automotive industry kicked in.

1936: First-ever car from the company

Sakichi Toyoda died in 1930 leaving all on the shoulders of his son. With the seed funding his father gave, Kiichiro started a car factory. Toyoda Model AA, yes! this was the name of their first car. It was rather a prototype made by the company.

1937: Toyota comes into existence

Sakichi sold the patent rights for his automatic loom and received $1,23,970 in return. Kiichiro used this amount to lay the foundation of Toyota Motor Corporation. Kiichiro Toyoda left behind two legacies. One was the TMC and the other is the Toyota Production System. His philosophy- producing precise quantities of already ordered items while making sure that there is a minimum possible wastage. Automakers around the globe still use this production system.

1939: World War II

With the damages, Japan had to sustain, industries crashed. But Toyota was not ready to give in to the disruption. But there was something opposite waiting for the company. With increasing prices of raw materials, the company was reporting a loss on a regular basis. This led to the labour union thinking of job cuts soon. By 1950, there was a dispute between the loss-ridden company and the labour.

1955: Company emerges from the conflicts

This year marked the entry of Toyota Crown, the first-ever car to be introduced by carmaker for the customers of Japan. It was made to ease the demands of public transportation in Japan. Toyota acquired around 40% share of the market and became the largest automotive manufacturer in Japan. Within two years of great success in the country, Toyota started to enter the international markets. In the USA, the car was introduced in 1957 with features like radio, heater and white wall tyres which earned the name “Baby Cadillac” for it.

Since then, the company never looked back. In 1963, Toyota stepped into the European markets too. In 1965, Toyota introduced Corolla to the world which still is a very popular premium sedan. The company gained enough reputation to take on the local rivals in the countries it was entering. Toyota was already gaining popularity over other brands in the markets of the USA and Europe.

1999: Toyota Comes To India

Suzuki in a merger with Maruti Udyog was already in India from 1982. It took another 18 years for another Japenese brand to set afoot at our shores. Toyota entered India with a joint venture with Kirloskar. The first-ever car Toyota Kirloskar introduced in India was Toyota Qualis, an MPV sold by the name of Kijang in Japan. The MPV became a famous one in India.

Another MPV launched by Toyota was Innova. The rear-wheel driven Innova was loaded with features at that time and was still affordable. This is what has made the MPV one of the best-selling MPVs of all time. Innova has been ruling the segment since its inception.

In the meanwhile. the company also introduced the Toyota Fortuner in 2009. The SUV has been a heartthrob since then among the SUV buyers and has been one of the best selling in the segment.

The company also tapped in the sedan segment with Corolla in 2003. It brought with it, reliability, comfort and luxury, which raised the standards of luxury in the sedan segment. By 2004, Toyota Corolla became the largest selling executive sedan in India. The company also introduced the likes of Toyota Etios Liva, Camry and Yaris. Toyota has introduced cars in every segment and for every type of buyer.

It has been known for reliability, affordability and comfort. This has made Toyota stay in the top 6 automakers in India. Company has been strongly making a presence from 20 years now.

2019: The Year Of Distress In Indian Automobile Industry

Toyota completed 20 years in India last year. But the 20th anniversary was not as good as the company planned. With BS6 emission norms announced and the consumer preferences changing, the industry saw a great dip in sales. Toyota was also one of the manufactures to face hardship at this time. But the company took a decision to collaborate with India’s largest carmaker, Maruti Suzuki. Under this collaboration, Maruti Suzuki will share 25-30% of the product volume with Toyota to rebadge. The first product to get rebadged was the Baleno which launched under the name of Glanza in the company’s arena.

With Toyota maintaining a good spot in the automotive industry globally, the future for the company looks bright as it has always been known for the sturdiness of the vehicles. If you see a 2005 Toyota Innova running smoothly on the road, no need to get stunned as these machines were made to last by the company that was established with the same principle.

The companies might come and go but the ones that stay are the ones that believe in innovation. With the fast pace the time is changing, what do you think about the future of Toyota? Will it perish at the hands of the changing consumer preferences? Or will Toyota innovate a way into success?


The Incredibly Evil Khazarian Mafia Behind Pearl Harbor Attack (Part II)

What we now know, eternally grateful to the uncovering and publishing of the real story, is that no amount of good will, no amount of concession on the part of the Japanese government in 1941, would deter Franklin Roosevelt and his Jewish power brokers from the drive to war with Japan.

…by Jonas E. Alexis and Mark Dankof

Jonas E. Alexis: We have touched on quite a number of issues with regard to the Pearl Harbor attack thus far. Many people still don’t know that Roosevelt deliberately lied to the American people. Prolific historian Thomas Fleming, who passed away last July at the age of 90, said that Roosevelt

“had seduced America into the war with clever tricks, one-step-forward one-step-back double-talk, and the last resort provocation of Japan. Deceit had been at the heart of the process.”[1]

Those are strong words, particularly when Roosevelt has been widely revered among what David Irving would have called “conformist historians.” But Roosevelt would not have produced those “clever tricks” if the World Jewish Congress and Henry Morgenthau Jr., didn’t push him to the edge. Fleming suggests that Roosevelt seemed to have feared Rabbi Stephen Wise and Morgenthau. Even the State Department knew that there was “a wild rumor inspired by Jewish fears” in the Roosevelt administration.[2] Fleming writes:

“Pressured by his Jewish secretary of treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., Roosevelt met for a half-hour with Wise and other Jewish leaders. In a typical fashion, when he was faced with the topic that he wished to evade or avoid, FDR spent most of the time talking about other things and finally confessed he had no idea how to stop the slaughter. All he could offer was another statement condemning the Nazis in general terms and warning them of postwar retribution.”[3]

Obviously FDR was ideologically confronted with the Jewish question. In fact, his “attempts to skirt the Bill of Rights and pressure his attorney general into silencing the Jew-baiting loudmouths of the lunatic fringe in court were evidence that this problem loomed large in his mind.”[4]

So, the “Khazarian Mafia,” as Preston James would have put it, had a tremendously powerful influence on FDR. Is there another aspect of this entire debacle?

Mark Dankof: There is another critical Rosetta Stone and smoking gun in the Pearl Harbor conspiracy involving Franklin Roosevelt and the subsequent set-up of Admiral Husband Kimmel (CINCPAC), and the later publication of the fraudulent Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor attack.

I will simply mention it for those subsequently interested in further research of this horrifying episode in American history: The Prokofiev Seamount and the Vacant Sea Order.[5]

These gems are accompanied by the White House Route Logs and Station US files, RG 38, MMRB, Archives H Document, which lists the Thirty Six Americans Cleared to Read the Japanese Diplomatic and Military Intercepts in 1941.

What is incredible about this document is that it proves (“access restricted”) that the intelligence from this electronic surveillance and decryption was withheld from Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, CINCPAC in Hawaii, and Lieutenant General Walter Short, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army, Fort Shafter, Oahu. Why?

I hope that at this point in the narrative, everyone here is already connecting the dots. The Mythology that surrounds Franklin Delano Roosevelt to this day could not be sustained without the absolute cooperation of the American government, the corporations, the news media, Hollywood, the sycophants in the American National Security apparatus, and the educational system. This Mythology conceals the illegal, un-Constitutional, and yes, criminal mind of America’s 32 nd President.

Harry Dexter White

Even more so, for those who are analyzing Roosevelt by comparison now to George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and their respective actions vis a vis Iran and the Middle East in the 21 st century,the references we have already made to secrecy, duplicity, economic sanctions, and illegal covert military operations conducted by Franklin Roosevelt, should serve as an ominously suggestive prototype and precursor to what has been happening with American Presidential Administrations of recent years and their equally criminal operations against Iran.

Even more ominously, as demonstrated by Mark Weber in his essay, “President Roosevelt’s Campaign to Incite War in Europe: The Secret Polish Documents,” the political forces operating behind and through Franklin Roosevelt, are identical to those in play in the American political power elite now:

International Central Bankers and the disproportionate role of Jews in that milieu Zionists and the Jewish and Israeli Lobby organizations and in the case of the Roosevelt Administration, the pro-Soviet foreign policy agenda of key Jewish agents in their midst, the 20 th century counterpart to the Israel First Fifth Column operating in the Bush and Obama Administrations in the 21st, as demonstrated by the publicly revealed names in the United States involved in the successful Public Relations campaign to have the American State Department remove the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK/MKO) from the official American governmental list of known terrorist organizations around the globe.

But let us return, momentarily to Franklin Roosevelt and the run-up to Pearl Harbor. In this instance, our focus shall now be upon the diplomatic games being played by the United States Government with Japan leading to December 7 th , 1941. Here, Mythology matches what it accomplishes with the McCollum Memorandum and its Eight (8) Point Action Memo.

What we now know, eternally grateful to the uncovering and publishing of the real story, is that no amount of good will, no amount of concession on the part of the Japanese government in 1941, would deter Franklin Roosevelt and his Jewish power brokers from the drive to war with Japan.

This is easily understood. 1) Central Bankers always profit by war. In the case of the United States, this is fueled by the creation of the Federal Reserve Board in 1913, as a precursor to the absolute global militarization of American foreign policy ever since.

2) An American-Japanese war in the Pacific would not simply be a back-door way of involving the United States in Churchill’s war against Hitler in Europe, also a Jewish objective, but would terminate the threat of an alliance between Imperial Japan and Adolf Hitler in a two way invasion of the Soviet Union. This was an essential objective of the Jewish power nexus. David Martin’s aforementioned essay gingerly admits this.

The key for understanding this last point is Operation Snow, the Rosetta Stone. Take it to the bank. The information about Operation Snow continues to unfold. The recent release of John Koster’s Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR’s White House Triggered Pearl Harbor, has begun this new unraveling of Establishment American History About Roosevelt and World War II in earnest.

The Soviet Mole is Harry Dexter White. White was the son of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants to the United States. When the evidence becomes too voluminous to deny, regarding pro-Stalin agents and Franklin Roosevelt, you can at least be sure the American Establishment will detach White, and so many others, from the obvious implications of their Jewish identification.

In the same way, the modern Jewish character of the American Neo-Conservative political movement, which drives the American war machine globally and in the Middle East, which is proven by a blizzard of responsible academic research and writing, will be buried by a compliant American media and educational establishment beholden to Zionist interests.

How much longer can this continue? And how much more obvious must it be, that every single American military operation in the Middle East and Central Asia today, is driven by the Israeli/Jewish agenda compiled by the Project for the New American Century in 1996 and its document of that time entitled, “A Clean Break: A Strategy for Securing the Realm”?

The basic facts are these. Japan in 1941 was bogged down in a 4 year war with China she could neither win nor end. Japan’s move into French Indochina had created a sense that the Japanese Empire was at the end of the line in its war configuration.

Inside the Japanese government was a powerful faction led by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye that desperately wanted to avoid war with the United States. The pro-Anglo-Saxon camp included the Japanese Navy. The War Party within the Japanese government included the Army, General Hideki Tojo, and Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, whose virulent anti-American views were especially pronounced in the anti-Anglo-Saxon camp in the struggle for control of the direction of the Japanese government.

On July 18, 1941, a critically important opportunity emerged for the United States. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye ousted Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka. Konoye’s replacement proved to be a pro-Anglo-Saxon, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda.

The American response was equally pivotal. It proved what I believe to be just as true today of a Zionist Occupied American Government in the latter’s desire to see a war with Iran transpire, at any cost, because of the Talmudic bloodlust of the Netanyahu regime in Israel and its backers in the United States.

Franklin Roosevelt wanted war with Japan, at any cost, because the Bankers wanted that conflict to transpire as a prelude to a back-door entry into the British war with Adolf Hitler, and because it guaranteed Japan’s diversion from any threat of participation with Hitler in a two-pronged invasion of Bolshevik Russia, a Bolshevik Russia dear to the hearts of organized World Jewry and the Harry Dexter Whites of the Roosevelt administration.

On July 25, 1941, one week after the apparent victory of Konoye over Matsuoka, the United States froze all Japanese assets in the United States, ending all imports and exports, and denying Japan the oil upon which the Japanese Empire depended.

One thing is clear. Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye, although stunned, still believed in the desire of the United States for peace with his country, and won secret support from both the Japanese Navy and Army for a meeting with Franklin Roosevelt, on the U. S. side of the Pacific, to continue good faith dialogue with the American Chief Executive.

It is especially noteworthy that U. S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, implored his Administration not to ignore the overture from Konoye or the opportunity for peaceful resolution of the crisis offered. Konoye had convinced Grew an agreement on Japanese withdrawal from Indochina, and from South and Central China, could be reached. Fear of Mao’s armies and Stalin’s Russia understandably prompted Japan to hold a buffer in North China.

On August 28, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States presented Franklin Roosevelt a letter, containing Konoye’s offer to the President to meet face-to-face. There was but one condition: Tokyo begged Roosevelt to keep the letter, and the offer, secret. The reason was entirely legitimate: a public revelation of the Japanese Prime Minister’s offer to cross the Pacific to speak to an American President could imperil the survivability of his government.

Yes, you guessed it. On September 3, 1941, the letter and its contents were conveniently leaked to the Herald-Tribune newspaper.

On September 6, 1941, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye met again with American Ambassador Joseph Grew over a 3 hour dinner, telling Grew the Japanese now agreed with the 4 principles advanced by the United States Government for peace.

The response from Roosevelt: No response.

On September 29, 1941, Grew sent what Herbert Hoover described as a “prayer” to Roosevelt, begging the latter not to let a chance for peace elude the United States.

On September 30, 1941, Grew wrote to Washington, “Konoye’s warship is ready and waiting to take him to Honolulu, Alaska, or anywhere else designated by the President [Roosevelt].”

No response. On October 16, 1941, Konoye’s cabinet fell.

In November, the United States intercepted 2 new offers from Tokyo: a Plan A for an end to the China war and occupation of Indochina. If that were rejected, Plan B called for a modus vivendi where neither side would make any new moves.

The response from Roosevelt: Rejection out of hand.

This then brought about the infamous meeting of Franklin Roosevelt’s War Council, on November 25, 1941. In this gathering, Secretary of War Henry Stimson [privy as we have already seen to Roosevelt’s illegal incursions into Japanese territorial waters courtesy of Arthur McCollum’s Action D recommendations], makes written notes of the conversations of the War Council. The prevailing consensus, according to Stimson, is as follows:

“The question was how we should maneuver them (the Japanese) into. . . firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.”

What was the result of Mr. Roosevelt’s version of diplomacy?

Here is the result for all to see: Thousands of lives ended or ruined, the burnt ashes of a radiated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the fall of China to Mao, American involvement in Korea and Vietnam, the rise of Communist China, and the expansion of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe and elsewhere after the end of World War II.

The establishment of the Zionist State of Israel in 1948 would pin the fortunes of the United States to this entity, resulting in the present overextension of the American Empire in the Middle East and Central Asia, with yet more war to unfold.

This is why Tyler Kent, the American linguist and cryptologist operating out of the American Embassy in London, revealed to key figures in the American Congress and elsewhere, what Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were cooking up in the runup to Pearl Harbor. Kent was the Edward Snowden of his time.

In the aftermath of his arrest in May of 1940, his life would never be quite the same again. The shadow of Roosevelt and his duplicity in destroying what Kent knew of the United States prior to that time, would follow the latter all the way to the end of his life in Kerrville, Texas in 1988.

Even more ominously, it proved to be the expansion of the insidious doctrine of American Exceptionalism, the Rooseveltian belief in the Imperial Presidency as understood by Mr. Roosevelt’s successors, the explosion of growth in an American National Security State which threatens the Bill of Rights and the survivability of the American Dollar, and the ongoing expansion of Jewish power in all the basic institutions in American life since the end of the Roosevelt era and the Second World War that many argue marked the beginning of the end of the Western World.

These are the fruits of American “victory,” a most Pyrrhic triumph. Among these poisonous fruits has been the introduction of the demonic into the American-Iranian relationship, courtesy of the 1953 Operation Ajax of the American CIA and the British MI6, and the backing of the Rockefeller Empire, the oil consortiums, and the Zionist entity.

When we speak of Mythology, Demonization, and the Erasure of Historical Memory, let me share with you that when I visited Iran as a young person for the first time at age 18, I had no idea of what the United States had done in this country in 1953, or why. The names of Kermit Roosevelt and Donald Wilber meant nothing to me. The name of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh meant nothing to me.

The increasing tension I sensed in a handful of summers in Iran in Pahlavi Iran in the 1970s was one I could not possibly understand as a young American college student. The information, and the context, of this brewing cauldron was one that had been at first denied to me.

Later I would receive a false spin and explanation for what had happened years before, couched primarily in the notion advanced by defenders of the American Governmental Establishment that Dr. Mossadegh was a “Communist” working in tandem with the Soviet KGB in Iran against both American and the Free World.

If the Endgame of Pearl Harbor is the world we presently live in, it pales in comparison to the monstrous ramifications in history just ahead, if Netanyahu, the Lobby, and their allies in the governments of America and Europe get their way, with what they desire to do both to Iran, and to American dissidents like me who use our meager resources and lack of power to speak the truth to demonically exercised powers and principalities.

The aggressors against Iran are the same despots who have destroyed the economy, the culture, and the Constitutional Bill of Rights of the United States, especially since the advent of Franklin Roosevelt and World War II.

And in closing, with God’s help, we shall win, for our families, our friends, our communities, our churches and mosques, our respective cultures and histories. At the end of history, Christian and Islamic eschatology agree: The godly shall win, and evil shall be comprehensive defeated and destroyed at a divinely appointed hour. Be sure of this.

The final victory is ours. Be sure of this. You and I are on the winning team. And each one of us has a unique contribution to make, as the God of history empowers us and emboldens us to speak the truth in love, with the Blessed Endgame now in sight, and within our grasp.

Jonas E. Alexis: Both Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel would have agreed with you, that those who ally themselves with the truth are on the winning side. Solzhenitsyn, who won a Nobel Prize, cogently wrote:

“Our way must be: never knowingly support lies! Having understood where the lies begin—step back from that gangrenous edge! Let us not glue back the flaking scale of the Ideology, not gather back its crumbling bones, nor patch together its decomposing garb, and we will be amazed how swiftly and helplessly the lies will fall away, and that which is destined to be naked will be exposed as such to the world.”[6]


A Brief Look at the Long History of the Toyota Motor Company

Toyota may seem like a fairly new automotive company in this country, but its history goes back more than seventy-five years. There are many surprising facts about the history of Toyota, not the least of which is the name itself. Sakichi Toyoda created groundbreaking designs, one of which brought the inventor enough money to found the Toyota Motor Company.

The change to the name from Toyoda to Toyota was supposedly meant to make it easier to pronounce. In the beginning, the company was supported in part by the Japanese government due to its military applications.

Toyoda&rsquos son Kiichiro took control of the car operations after Japan stopped nearly all imports in 1936. The first vehicles he produced had two cylinders, soon to be replaced by vehicles that copied the design of the Chevrolet 65 hp straight-six with some features coming from the Chrysler Airflow. Toyota produced their first engine in 1934, with the first car and truck following in 1935. However, two years later in 1937, the company was split off.

The Beginning of Toyota&rsquos Expansion

At the end of 1945, the U.S. military gave Toyota permission to begin peacetime production. They used what they had learned from America&rsquos industrial training program to continue making products in Japan even after the program was abandoned in the U.S.

While the company made trucks after WWII, they had begun to make the Toyopet, or Model SA, that was available to drivers at a cheap price, and it was made to maneuver the rough roads of Japan following the war. Only 215 SA Toyopets were made, but the SF Toyopet that followed resulted in sales of 8,400 annually by 1955, and 600,000 annually ten years later in 1965.

Next came the Toyota Land Cruiser, a civilian truck that was based on the design of the Dodge half-ton weapons carriers, along with the Bantam. Afterward, in 1958, Toyota introduced the Crown, their first luxury car.

Toyota Goes International

In 1957, Toyota started on the road to international sales with a headquarters in Hollywood and the first of their vehicles to be registered in the U.S. Company president Shotaro Kamiya personally installed the California license plates in front of the state DMV.

When the Land Cruiser and Toyopet failed to reach a significant number of sales, the company focused on creating a car that was designed especially for the American market. This resulted in the introduction of the Avalon and Camry.

The Tiara, or Corona, was the first Americanized Toyota, providing a 90 hp engine and significant passenger room, along with performance, comfort, and good gas mileage. By 1967, Toyota Motor Company had become an established brand in the U.S., and the Crown was introduced in a choice of wagon or sedan.

The 2000GT was not far behind, along with a variety of trucks that became available during the late 1960s. The Toyota Corolla that many buyers look for at the Toyota dealership today was first imported to the U.S. in 1969, and it became the first Toyota to be built in the country in 1985.

Toyota Motor Company Today

Toyota has continued to grow through dedication to creating a vehicle that is dependable, performs well, and has superior safety features. They are one of the largest auto manufacturers in the world, and continue to fight a close battle against GM and Ford for the number one spot.

With more than 5.5 million vehicles being produced yearly, and with many award-winning designs and a reputation for innovative technology to their credit, the company has definitely exceeded their goal for creating a niche in the American auto market. The Toyota name continues to be associated with dependability and performance for new drivers and dedicated Toyota drivers, and they continue to deliver new ideas for the future.


The Failed Attempt to Avert War with Japan, 1941

The attack by the Imperial Japanese Army against the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor catapulted the United States into World War II. While many are familiar with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, less is known about the attempts by Japan and the U.S. to avert war.

Tensions were running high between Japan and the United States long December 7th. Japan was fighting what was almost a decade-long war against the Chinese in Manchuria. After the bombing of the USS Panay on the Yangtze River in December 1937 (which Japan had claimed was an accident), the U.S. and their allies began sending assistance to China. The Japanese continued their aggression with the occupation of French Indochina, and the U.S. began taking preventative measures. In 1941 the United States ceased oil shipments to Japan. The U.S. and Japan began negotiations to end sanctions and make peace, but their efforts were unsuccessful. President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye (at right), and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew were on the verge of arranging a meeting in Alaska, but the parties could not come to an agreement on terms.

Robert A. Fearey was serving as the private secretary Ambassador Grew, during the time surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor. In 1998, he shared his memoirs with ADST, recollecting the days leading up to the attack, the failed attempts at peace and the declaration of war. Read about his time as a detainee in the embassy as well as his thoughts about the failed negotiations written years after the war.

You can read Niles Bond’s account of being detained in the U.S. Consulate in Yokohama in the months after Pearl Harbor as well as other accounts of World War II.

“Washington’s initial reaction to a Roosevelt- Konoye meeting was not unfavorable”

FEAREY: As the weeks passed, I became aware that Grew and [Embassy Counselor Eugene] Doorman were heavily preoccupied with an undertaking which they believed could critically affect the prospects for averting the war. Though the matter was closely held within the embassy, I learned that it related to a proposal Grew had transmitted to Washington from Prime Minister Konoye that he and President Roosevelt meet face-to–face in Honolulu in an effort to fundamentally turn U.S.-Japan relations around before it was too late.

Grew had told Washington that Konoye was convinced that he would be able to present terms for such a settlement at such a meeting which the U.S. and its allies would be able to accept. Konoye had said that the terms had the backing of the Emperor and of Japan’s highest military authorities and that senior military officers were prepared to accompany him to the meeting and put the weight of their approval behind the hoped-for agreement with the President on the mission’s return to Japan. Grew and Doorman had strongly recommended that Washington agree to the meeting.

Reverting to the Konoye proposal, although my knowledge of the cables back and forth was limited at the time, the records show that Washington’s initial reaction to the proposal was not unfavorable. The idea caught the President’s imagination. In a late August session with Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburu Nomura, Roosevelt “spoke of the difficulty of going as far as Hawaii and elaborated his reasons why it would be difficult to get away for 21 days. He turned to Juneau, Alaska as a meeting place, which would only require some 14 or 15 days, allowing for a three or four days conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister….

In his August 28 reply to Roosevelt through Nomura, Konoye said that “he would be assisted by a staff of about twenty persons, of whom five each would be from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Japanese Embassy at Washington.” Nomura “thought that the inclusion of Army and Navy representatives would be especially beneficial in view of the responsibility, which they would share for the settlement reached.” Konoye told Grew about this time that a destroyer with steam up awaited in Yokohama to carry him and his associates to the meeting place. An Embassy officer who lived in Yokohama confirmed this.

However, at a meeting with Nomura at the White House on September 3, the President read a message, prepared at State, from him to Konoye, which included the statement that “it would seem highly desirable that we take precautions toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussions of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement….”

When Nomura asked whether the President was still favorable to a conference, “the President replied that he was but that it was very important to settle a number of these questions beforehand if the success of the conference was to be safeguarded…” He added that “it would be necessary for us to discuss the matter fully with the British, the Chinese and the Dutch, since there is no other way to effect a suitable peaceful settlement for the Pacific area.”

In succeeding meetings, Roosevelt and Hull reiterated these two themes: that the proposed meeting must be preceded by preliminary U.S.-Japan discussions of (by which they clearly meant agreement on) “the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement,” and by U.S. consultation with our Chinese, British and Dutch allies. In a September 4th meeting with Nomura, Hull said that “this was especially necessary with the Chinese who might otherwise be apprehensive lest we betray them. He (Hull) felt that before we are in a position to go to the Chinese, the American and Japanese Governments should reach a clear understanding in principle on the various points to be discussed affecting China.” Concern for Chiang Kai-shek’s reactions was clearly a key factor in the Administration’s thinking.

Konoye’s Fear of Assassination by Fanatical Japanese

Konoye [seen at right], in his initial broaching of the meeting idea in the spring, had explained to Grew, and he to Washington, why it was necessary for him to meet personally with Roosevelt outside Japan and why he would be able to propose terms at such a meeting which he could never propose through diplomatic channels. If he had said he was to use such channels to provide the specific assurances Washington sought on the China question and other issues, his Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, who had led Japan into the Axis Pact with Germany and Italy and who, with the Germans and Italians, would do anything to prevent a Japanese accommodation with the U.S., would immediately leak those assurances to fanatical Japanese elements and to the German and Italian embassies he (Konoye) would be assassinated, and the whole effort would fail.

A further risk of hostile leaks lay in the codes through which the Embassy and the State Department communicated. The Embassy hoped that one of its codes was still secure, but Konoye told Grew that he believed that Japanese cryptographers had broken all the others. The Embassy did not know that we had broken the Japanese codes and that Washington knew everything that passes by cable between Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Tokyo.

After Matsuoka was forced to resign as Foreign Minister following the German invasion of Russia in June, Konoye told Grew, and he Washington, that Matsuoka had left supporters behind in the Foreign Office who would equally leak the positive and forthcoming terms which he (Konoye) intended to propose to the President. On the other hand, Konoye maintained that if he, accompanied by senior representatives of the Army and Navy, could meet face-to-face with Roosevelt, propose those terms and have them accepted in principle, subject to Washington and Allied concurrence and the working out of detailed implementing arrangements, the reaction of relief and approval in Japan would be so strong that die-hard elements would be unable to prevail against it.

Grew and Doorman supported this reasoning. From the Emperor down, they told Washington, the Japanese knew that the China venture was not succeeding. Particularly after the July freezing of Japanese assets abroad and the embargo on oil and scrap shipments to Japan, the endless war in China was driving Japan into ruin. Every time a taxi went around the corner, Japan had less oil. There was solid reason to believe that the bulk of the Japanese people, except for the die-hards and fanatics, would sincerely welcome a face-saving settlement that would enable the country to pull back, on an agreed schedule, from China and Southeast Asia, even if not from Manchuria.

Japan had now held Manchuria for nine years and successfully integrated its economy into the homeland economy, and its disposition presented special problems which would have to be worked out in agreement with Nationalist China (Chiang Kai-shek reportedly declared in 1937 that China was determined to give up no more of its territory — a tacit admission that the return of Manchuria to China could not at that time be expected). But the time was now — the opportunity had to be seized before Japan’s economic situation and internal discontent reached so serious a level that the military felt obliged and entitled to take complete control and launch Japan on a suicidal was against the West.

Washington Stalls

Grew told Washington that because of the risks of hostile exposure, Konoye could not provide the clear and specific commitments concerning China, Indochina, the Axis Pact, non-discriminatory trade and other issues which Washington sought before the proposed meeting. On the other hand, he argued, there was strong reason to believe that Konoye would be able to provide those commitments at the proposed meeting and that with the Emperor’s [Hirohito, at left], the top military’s and the people’s support, they would be carried out. No one could guarantee this, but the alternative was almost certainly replacement of the Konoye Government and a rapid descent toward war. A State Department paraphrase of an August 18th Grew cable to Hull concluded as follows:

“The Ambassador urges with all the force at his command for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely, owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship, such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific.”…

As the weeks passed and Washington still withheld approval of Konoye’s meeting proposal, he and Grew became increasingly discouraged. Konoye warned at their secret meetings that time was running out, that he would soon have no alternative but to resign and be succeeded by a prime minister and cabinet offering far less chance of determinedly seeking and being able to carry out a mutually acceptable U.S.-Japan settlement. Again and again Grew urged Washington to accept the meeting as the last, best chance for a settlement. He urged that not only Konoye, but he and Doorman firmly believed the Emperor and Japan’s top military and civilian leaders wished to reverse Japan’s unsuccessful military course, if this could be accomplished without an appearance of abject surrender. Japan could not pull its forces out of China and Indochina overnight without such an appearance, but it could commit itself to a course of action which would accomplish that result in an acceptable period of time under effective safeguards.

With New Men in Charge, Hopes Fade

Personalities can make an important difference in such situations. Secretary Hull’s principal Far Eastern advisor was a former professor named Stanley K. Hornbeck. Coming to the post with a China background, he was personally known by Grew and other Embassy Tokyo officers to have shown disdain and dislike for the Japanese. Word reached the Embassy that it was largely as a result of his influence and advice that Roosevelt’s and Hull’s initially favorable reaction to the meeting proposal had cooled. It was largely at his insistence that the policy of requiring Japan to provide clear and specific assurances on outstanding issues, particularly respecting China, before such a meeting could be held had been adopted.

Hornbeck was quoted as saying that Grew had been in Japan too long, that he was more Japanese than the Japanese and that all one had to do with the Japanese was to stand up to them, and they would cave. The Embassy heard that State’s “Japan hands,” led by Joseph W. Ballantine, tended to agree with its recommendations, but how strongly was not clear. What did seem clear was that Hornbeck had the upper hand and that his views were prevailing with Hull and Roosevelt.

On October 16, Konoye, having pleaded and waited in vain for U.S. acceptance of his meeting proposal, resigned and was replaced by General Hideki Tojo. In a private conversation with Grew, Konoye put the best face he could on this development, recalling that Tojo, as War Minister in Konoye’s cabinet, had personally supported the meeting proposal and had been prepared to put his personal weight behind the hoped-for agreement with the President. But Grew and Doorman now held little hope for peace, believing that the chance which Konoye had presented of a reversal, not at once, but by controlling stages, of Japan’s aggressive course had been lost. The Washington talks continued, and Grew employed his talents to the full with his old friends, the new Foreign Minister, Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, and others to make them succeed. But he was privately frank to say that in his view, the die had been cast when Konoye gave up on the proposed meeting and resigned.

Reflecting this view, Grew sent a number of cables during October and November, warning that the Japanese, finding themselves in a corner as a result of the freeze and embargo, not only might, but probably would, resort to an all-out, do-or-die attempt to render Japan invulnerable to foreign economic pressures, even if the effort were tantamount to national hara-kiri.

In a message on November 3, he expressed the hope that the U.S. would not become involved in war “because of any possible misconception of Japan’s capacity to rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States.” He said that “the sands are running fast,” and that “an armed conflict with the United States may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness.”

Earlier in the year, he had reported that the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo had informed diplomatic colleagues that a Japanese Admiral in his cups had been heard to say that if war came, it would start with an attack on Pearl Harbor. The contrast between Grew’s prescient warnings and Hornbeck’s reported view that if one stood up to the Japanese, they would cave, could not be more stark. But “China-hand” Hornbeck’s analysis prevailed over that of our Tokyo Embassy, not only with Hull and the President, but also apparently with our military authorities responsible for our Pacific defenses.

“And So War Came”

And so war came. It was Sunday in the U.S. but Monday morning, December 8, when the news reached us in Tokyo. At about 8:00, I walked over from my apartment to the Embassy chancery–a distance of about forty feet. There, standing or lying around on the chancery lobby floor, were a collection of golf bags. It was the day for the “Tuffy’s Cup” annual golf tournament, inaugurated some years before by the British Naval Attaché, Captain Tuffnel.

Chip Bohlen came down the stairs. Had I heard the news? The Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor and other points around the Western Pacific, and the Imperial Headquarters had announced that a state of war existed between Japan and the U.S. and its Allies. As I absorbed this intelligence, other Embassy officers arrived, most having heard the news from their drivers, who had heard it over their car radios.

The Ambassador had not yet come in, so I went up to his residence. He was relating to Ned Crocker how he had delivered a personal message from the President to the Emperor through Foreign Minister Togo [named to that position in October 1941] at midnight and how he had been called over to Togo’s office at 7:30 that morning to receive the Emperor’s reply. Grew said that if Togo had known about the attack, he had given no sign of it on either occasion, through his manner had been even stiffer than usual that morning. That, however, could be accounted for by the fact that the Emperor’s response to the President’s message had broken off the year-long U.S.-Japan negotiations. Grew later heard on good authority that Togo knew nothing of the attack until the news came over the radio early Monday morning….

“Gokkai, Gokkai,” “Extra, Extra”

I then went down to the compound’s front gate, which was closed tight with Japanese police standing all about. Outside, up the street, I heard a newsboy calling “Gokkai, Gokkai,” meaning “Extra, Extra” and waving copies of the English language “official” Japanese Government newspaper, The Japan Times and Advertiser, on which I could see gigantic headlines. It occurred to me that the paper would probably not only be informative on what happened, but would make a great souvenir. So I walked as inconspicuously as I could back along the eight-foot wall surrounding the compound to a corner where some small pine trees provided a little cover. There I scrambled over the wall, bought two copies of the paper, one to give to Grew and one to keep, and scrambled back. Fortunately, this somewhat foolhardy maneuver was not noticed by the police, who I knew had orders to allow no one in or out of the compound without express official permission.


Watch the video: Akio Toyoda Embarks on Journey for Ice Cream (July 2022).


Comments:

  1. Wayde

    The number will not work!

  2. Ferghus

    For a positive morning, I just need to read a couple of posts in my favorite section on your blog

  3. Kaori

    I consider, that you commit an error. I can defend the position.

  4. Voistitoevitz

    She has visited the simply magnificent idea

  5. Zulkisida

    You are making a mistake. I can prove it. Email me at PM, we will talk.



Write a message